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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper describes how a monopolist manipulates the balance of quantity and quality in 
order to increase revenue when its customers treat quantity and quality as substitutes. This 
‘skewing’ of quality depends on the characteristics of customer’s demand for quality. 
Customers differ in demand for quality, because they differ in either (i) their preferences 
and/or (ii) their time cost per unit. The monopolist is constrained to supply the same quality 
of good to all customers. The price and quality per unit are described under the assumption 
the monopolist (i) profit maximises; (ii) maximises social welfare subject to a profit 
constraint. The determinants of the skewing of quantity and quality are found under third 
degree price discrimination and uniform pricing.  
  
JEL Classification: D42, D11, L15; ePrint Code: 340100. 
 
                                                 
* This paper extends the analysis of Sibly (2004). 
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The Determinants of the Quantity-Quality Balance in Monopoly 
 
Customers often differ in the relative importance they place on the quality of a 
product. However, producing different varieties of a product with different quality levels is 
costly. Thus, even when the heterogeneity in customer preference for quality provides a 
significant benefit to vertical differentiation, this may prove too costly to be profitable. For 
example, coffee shops usually provide customers with only one quality level of coffee 
(although coffee is usually horizontally differentiated), even when customers have a 
heterogeneous demand for quality. Clearly there are numerous analogous examples. In 
addition, political considerations may require provision of uniform quality in regulated or 
government controlled industries, even if the product can be vertically differentiated at 
relatively modest cost.  
How do the various characteristics of the coffee shop customers’ demand influence 
the level of quality chosen by the coffee shop? More generally, what aspects of customer 
demand determine the quality level chosen by monopolist? This paper presents a model that 
provides an answer to these questions. In the model customers are assumed to treat quantity 
and quality as substitutes. Customers differ in demand for quality because they differ in either 
(i) their preferences and/or (ii) their income (more specifically, their opportunity cost of 
time). The monopolist who sells to these customers is constrained, either for cost or political 
reasons, to supply every market segment (customer type) with the same level of quality. The 
model identifies the influence each customer type has on the quality level chosen by the 
monopolist.   
The technical difficulties associated with dealing with utility functions which allow 
for the substitutability of quality for quantity for has resulted in the overwhelming bulk of the 
literature since Spence (1975) and Sheshinski (1976) following Mussa and Rosen’s (1978) 
lead in assuming each customer has unit demand.1 The assumption of unit demand is clearly 
                                                 
1 For an indication of the difficulties of analysing models with arbitrary consumer preferences (in the context of 
a multiproduct monopolist) see Armstrong (1996) and Sibley and Srinagesh (1997).  Note these papers are 
complicated by the considerations associated with a multidimensional screening problem; though also consider 
the case of nonlinear pricing which is technically relatively straightforward compared to uniform pricing. 
Sappington (2005) provides a survey of the evolution of the analysis of quality in regulated industries.  
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not entirely satisfactory to model the common situations in which customers make multiple 
purchases and are willing to trade off quantity and quality.2  
The form of consumer utility that underpins this paper’s analysis is different, yet 
arguably more plausible, than that usually assumed in the unit demand literature. In 
particular, it is assumed that an increase in quality increases the utility gained from each unit 
consumed. In this way utility is a function of the product of the number of units consumed 
and “satisfaction per unit”.3 Satisfaction per unit (as the name implies) represents the 
enjoyment the customer gain from consuming a unit of the product, and is assumed to be a 
function of quality alone. Importantly, the specification allows the substitutability of quality 
for quantity for each consumer to be defined. This representation of preferences is often 
realistic. Many, if not most, goods have the property that consumer benefit is related to the 
overall pleasure gained from consumption rather than the quality per unit alone or number of 
units alone. For example, the utility gained from consuming coffee is the product of the 
number of cups and the quality of each cup.  
This specification of consumer preferences enables the common sources of customer 
heterogeneity to be captured within the economics model. Customers differ in their demand 
for quality for two reasons: differences in their taste for quality and differences in the cost of 
time taken to consumer a unit of the product. Differences in the taste for quality arise because 
substitutability of quality for quantity differs across consumers. Customers also differ in the 
time cost of consuming one unit. For example, consumers with a relatively high hourly wage 
have a relatively high time cost of consuming each cup of coffee. This high time cost induces 
high wage customers to demand a high quality, and also inhibits substitution of quantity for 
quality. To capture these two sources of heterogeneity, customers are divided into ‘types’: 
customers within a type have a common substitutability of quality for quantity and a time 
cost per unit. The model allows demand elasticities to vary across customer within a type. 
The type’s elasticity of demand is the weighted sum of the individual customers’ elasticities 
of demand within the type. The differences in the elasticity across customer types are shown 
to be an important determinant of manner in which quality is skewed.  
                                                 
2 The unit demand model can be shoehorned into modelling downward sloping demand curves by assuming as 
set of customers with a distribution of willingness to pay. However this approach clearly has its limits. This is 
seen clearly by the importance of the role of customers’ elasticity of demand in the analysis of this paper.  
3 Some early work adopted the (implicit) assumption that utility arose from the product of number of units and 
quality per unit, notably Levhari and Peles (1973) and Kihlstrom and Levhari (1977). These analyses assumed 
all customers were homogenous in preferences.  
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The paper also uses a novel method of assessing the influence of the firm’s market 
power on quality. When quality is endogenous the firm must balance the quantity with the 
quantity it produces. This paper utilizes a definition of ‘quality skewing’, which provides a 
method to assess the degree that the monopolist’s affects the balance of quantity and quality 
in order to raise revenue. The extent and manner in which the monopolist skews quality is 
shown to be related to the characteristics of the demand of each customer type.  
The model could be applied to some industries that are natural monopolies. Prominent 
examples of such industries include many public utilities and government business 
enterprises such as parks, electricity, public transport, water supply, and telecommunications.  
A classic textbook question when discussing such industries is how they can be operated 
most efficiently while still generating sufficient revenue to cover costs. In the context of this 
papers analysis, it is of interest to analyse how the need to efficiently satisfy the profit 
constraint influences the balance of quality and quantity. The model is formulated so as to 
identify the social welfare maximising quantity and quality levels when the firm is constraint 
to satisfy a profit constraint. Thus the constrained efficient quantity and quality, together with 
the profit maximising quantity and quality are identified.  
 Section 1 of the paper describes consumer demand. Section 2 presents the case in 
which the firm can use third degree price discrimination. Section 3 considers the case where 
the firm is constrained to use uniform pricing. Section 4 presents an example of the model 
using iso-elastic functional forms. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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1. Consumers and their demand 
 
The firm can set the quality of the product under consideration along a continuum y. 
Assume the firm’s consumers are divided into n types. To capture differences in 
substitutability of quality and quantity (units) amongst customer types, let customer j, who is 
a member of type i (customer ij), measure their ‘satisfaction’ of consuming the product, xij, 
using the relationship xij=Xijgi(y). Call gi(y) the satisfaction per unit of type i. The elasticity 
of this customer’s “iso-satisfaction curve”, dxij=0, is: 
 
y
Xij
dXij
dy  = -ε i gy(y)      (1) 
 
where ε i gy≡ ygi′(y)/gi(y), i=1,2,..,n, be  the elasticity of i’s satisfaction per unit with respect to 
quality. By (1) ε i gy(y) also measures the substitutability of quality for quantity. Note this 
substitutability depends only on customer type. Assuming that gi″(y)<0 ensures that the 
customer’s indifference curves are convex.   
The utility function of customer ij is Uij(gi(y)Xij,Lij), where Lij is the leisure of the 
customer. Consumption of the each unit takes (non-leisure) time of ai≥0 hours. This imposes 
a “time cost” on customers for each unit consumed, and limits the customer’s willingness to 
substitute quality for quantity. It is shown below that it is necessary that ai is non-zero if 
customer type i’s income is to affect quality. Each consumer has of T hours available. 
Consumer ij’s budget constraint is thus: 
 
PiXij = wi(T-Lij-aiXij)      (2) 
 
where Pi is the price of per unit charge to type i customers and wi is the hourly wage rate of 
type i customers. The customer ij’s maximisation function is: 
 
Max Uij(gi(y)Xij,Lij)  subject to: ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Pi+aiwi
gi(y)  g
i(y)Xij + wiLij = wiT    (3) 
 
The price of satisfaction to customer ij, pi, is defined as pi≡(Pi+aiwi)/gi(y). Call aiwi type i 
consumers’ time cost per unit. Consumer ij’s optimisation problem may be written as: 
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Max Uij(xij,Lij) subject to  pixij/wi + Lij = T     (4) 
 
where xij≡gi(yi)Xij is the satisfaction provided to the customer from consumption of the 
product. 
It is natural to consider the consumer problem in the formulation (4) rather than (3). In 
the formulation (4), satisfaction is the “good” which the consumer must forgo to consume 
leisure. All type i customers face the common price and wage pi and wi. Thus standard 
consumer theory can be used to determine the demand for satisfaction and demand for units 
from type i customers as: 
 
xi(pi/wi) = ∑
j=1
mi
xij (pi/wi)   ⇔  Xi(Pi,gi(y),wi) =∑
i=1
mi
 
xij⎝⎛ ⎠⎞ 
Pi+aiwi
wigi(y)
gi(y)     (5) 
 
where reference to T is suppressed as it is common to all customer types. Type i’s elasticity 
of demand is given by: 
 
ε ix(pi/wi) ≡ - (pi/xi)(∂xi ∂pi) = - (pi/wixi).xi1(pi/wi)  = ((Pi+aiwi)/Pi)Εi X   (6) 
 
where Εi X ≡ -(Pi/Xi)(∂Xi/∂Pi) is called the ‘ordinary elasticity of demand’ for type i customers. 
Each consumer, j, of type i has an elasticity of demand that is defined analogously to (6), and 
these elasticities may differ across consumers of type i.  The elasticity, ε ix, is the weighted 
sum of the individual type i consumers’ elasticities of demand. The ordinary elasticity of 
demand is the measure of demand elasticity that is typically estimated in empirical studies, 
however it is ε ix that fully represents the preferences of consumers. Thus it is ε ix that is used in 
the analysis below to represent the elasticity of demand of each type of consumer. 
The industrial organization literature generally formulates its analysis using consumer 
surplus and consumer benefit rather than consumer utility. For consistency with this 
approach, and also for ease of analysis, this approach is adopted in this paper. Integrating 
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consumer i’s demand curve yields their consumer surplus4, vi(pi), where vi(pi) = ⌡⌠
pi
∞
xi(r/wi)dr. 
Note that (5) may be inverted to yield pi(xi).  
It is instructive to compare the specification of consumer preferences with that in 
related literature. Spence (1975) and Sheshinksi (1976) implicitly assume a representative 
consumer, whose demand is an arbitrary function of the number of units consumed and 
quality. Even with homogenous consumer preferences, it is difficult to draw general 
conclusions and make analytic progress with such a general specification of utility.  
Consequently most previous work on heterogeneity assumes, following Mussa and Rosen 
(1978), that the indirect utility function is given by U = θq-P + I, where θ is a taste parameter, 
q is quality, P is price per unit and I is utility from consumption of all other goods. Each 
consumer buys only one unit, and the willingness to pay for that unit varies with taste (and 
income). While this form of the utility function provides considerable analytical convenience, 
it is highly restrictive.  It is based on a cardinal rather than ordinal utility function, does not 
allow substitution possibilities between quality and quantity, and the assumed elasticity of 
consumer demand is very special indeed. For the majority of goods, like those discussed in 
the introduction, quantity demanded by each customer varies with the price and quality of the 
good.  
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2.  Third Degree Price Discrimination 
 
Under third degree price discrimination the firm can identify members of each group 
of customers. A distinct price per unit, Pi, is charged to members of group.  The firm’s 
technology is summarised by the cost function C(X,y), where X≡ ∑
i=1
n
Xi is total quantity. It is 
assumed that marginal cost of quantity (units produced), and the marginal cost of quality are 
non-negative, i.e. Cj(X,y)≥0 for j=1,2. The profit of the firm, π(p1,…,pn,y), is: 
 
π(p1,…,pn,y) = ∑
i=1
n
pixi(pi) –  f(x1(p1),..,xn(pn),y)   (7) 
 
where  f(x1,..,xn,y) ≡ F(x1/g1(y),…,xn/gn(y),y) where: 
 
F(X1,..,Xn,y)= C(X1+..+Xn,y) + ∑
i=1
n
 aiwiXi    (8) 
 
The F(X1,..,Xn,y) represents total cost (i.e. production cost plus the total time cost). It is 
useful to interpret f(x1,..,xn,y) as the total cost of providing satisfaction x1…xn to the 
respective customers as a function of quality.  The surplus from production of the good is 
given by: 
 
s(p1,…,pn,y) = ∑
i=1
n
vi(pi) + π(p1,…,pn,y)    (9) 
 
The social welfare maximising firm that is required to satisfy a profit constraint 
π(p1,…,pn,y)≤ π_. The firm’s optimisation problem is thus:   
 
max 
p1 …  pn y
  s(p1,…,pn,y) s.t. π(p1,…,pn,y) ≥ π_    (10) 
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The Lagrangian for this optimisation problem is: 
 
L(p1,…,pn,y) = ∑
i=1
n
vi(pi)+(1+λ)
⎣⎢
⎡
⎦⎥
⎤∑
i=1
n
pixi(pi)–  f(x1(p1),..,xn(pn),y)  -λπ_    (11) 
 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Note that the formulation (11) captures two important 
special cases: (i) profit maximising monopoly (λ→∞) and (ii) the unconstrained efficient 
outcome (λ=0). The first order condition ∂L/∂pi=0 yields: 
 
pi-fi(x1,…,xn,y)
pi   = ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞λ
1+λ
1
ε ix ⇔ 
Pi-C1(X,y)
Pi  = ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞λ
1+λ
1
Eix   (12) 
 
This is the familiar Lerner/Ramsey pricing rule. The first order condition ∂L/∂y=0 yields: 
 
y^ (x1,…,xn) = argmin
y
  f(x1,..,xn,y)     (13) 
 
The quality level y^ represents the ‘cost minimising quality level’. There exists a cost 
minimizing level of quality because an increase in quality has two effects on cost, which can 
be identified by differentiating (8) to give: 
 
fn+1(x1,..,xn,y) = C2(X1+…+Xn,y) -∑
i=1
n
[aiwi+C1(X1+…+Xn,y)]Xi
gi′(y)
gi(y)   (14)  
 
The first effect is the direct cost of producing increased quality is given by the first term on 
the RHS of (14). The second effect, given by the second term on the RHS of (14), is that the 
quantity required to produce a given level of satisfaction is reduced, thereby reducing cost. 
Cost is minimized at the quality where the former effect just outweighs the latter effect. 
Hence: 
Proposition 1: Under third degree price discrimination the monopolist chooses 
satisfaction and units according to the Lerner/Ramsey condition, (12), while quality is 
cost minimising, i.e. satisfies (13). 
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The first order conditions of the constrained optimisation problem (10) yield, as a special 
case, both the monopoly and (unconstrained) efficient outcomes. When the profit constraint is 
not binding (λ=0), equation (12) shows that (unconstrained) efficiency requires both types to 
pay the same price per unit, which is equal marginal cost. However, because both types value 
quality differently, they pay different prices of satisfaction. The monopoly level of pi is given 
by (12) when λ=∞. As is usual with price discrimination, the type with the higher elasticity of 
demand pays a lower price per unit. If the type with higher elasticity of demand also places a 
low value on quality per unit, then this group faces a higher price of satisfaction than the 
other group. However, if this is not the case, the relative size of the price of satisfaction 
between the groups is ambiguous.  
Quality is said to be skewed if it is possible to substitute quantity for quality, or visa 
versa, and raise the surplus. In particular skewed quality is defined as follows: 
Definition 1: In a market equilibrium quality is said to be downwardly (un-, 
upwardly) skewed if the social marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of quality for 
quality is less than (equal to, greater than) the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) 
of quality for quality.  
For the monopolist, quality can become skewed when, in order to raise revenue, the firm does 
not combine quality and quantity ‘efficiently’.  
In the case of third degree price discrimination, quality is downwardly (un-, 
upwardly) skewed with respect to type i’s quantity if: 
 
Sn+1(X1,..,Xn,y)
Si(X1,..,Xn,y)   >  (=, <)  
F n+1(X1,..,Xn,y)
Fi(X1,..,Xn,y)   (15) 
 
where S (X1,..,Xn,y) ≡s(p1(g1(y)X1),…,pn(gn(y)Xn),y) and thus the LHS of (15) is the social 
MRS of quality for type i’s quantity and the RHS of (15)  is the MRT of quality for type i’s 
quantity. The motivation for this definition is the observation that the unskewed combination 
of quantity and quality maximizes the surplus for a given level of resources devoted to 
production. It is thus not possible to raise the surplus by substituting quality for quantity or 
visa versa. Define: 
  
Zi(X1,..,Xn,y) ≡ C2(X1+..+Xn,y) - ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞Sn+1(X1,..,Xn,y)
Si(X1,..,Xn,y) [C1(X
1+..+Xn,y) + aiwi]  (16) 
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In the case of third degree price discrimination, quality is downwardly (un-, upwardly) 
skewed with respect to type i’s quantity if Zi <  (=, >) 0.   
 
Zi = ∑
j=1
n
(C1 +ajwj)⎣⎢
⎡
⎦⎥
⎤ε jx-ε ix
ε ix(ε jx-1 ) X
iε j gy     (17) 
 
Thus: 
Proposition 2: Under third degree price discrimination quality is downwardly (un-, 
upwardly) skewed with respect to type i’s quantity if, in equilibrium, the elasticity of 
demand of type i consumers is less than (equal to, more than) the elasticity of demand 
of all other types of consumers.  
If type i has the lowest elasticity of demand in equilibrium, it is possible to increase the 
surplus by substituting quantity for quantity. 
The monopolist’s production decision can be conceptually decomposed into two 
steps: (i) the monopolist restricts “output” (Xi or xi) provided to type i customers to increase 
profits in the manner described in textbooks, and (ii) the monopolist chooses the balance of 
output and quality to maximize profits. The former action is represented by movements along 
the contract curve, while the latter is the skewness (which is represented by movements away 
from the contract curve). The impact of these actions on quality is ambiguous: it depends on 
the slope of the contract curve and the direction of skewness. Thus equilibrium quality may 
either be above or below the efficient level. 
It is also possible to consider the quality being skewed with respect to the satisfaction 
provided to type i customers. In particular, quality is downwardly (un-, upwardly) skewed 
with respect to the satisfaction of type i customer  if zi <  (=, >) 0, where: 
 
zi(x1,..,xn,y) ≡ f n+1(x1,..,xn,y) - ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞σn+1(x1,..,xn,y)
 σi(x1,..,xn,y) fi(x
1,..,xn,y)  (18) 
 
where  σ(x1,…,xn,y) ≡ s(p1(x1),…,pn(xn),y). In equilibrium under third degree price 
discrimination zi = 0, hence quality is not skewed with respect to satisfaction of any of the 
consumer types. 
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3. Common price per unit 
 
Suppose the firm must apply a price per unit that is common to all customers. In this 
case the surplus may be written: 
 
S(P,y) = V(P,y) + π(P,y)     (19) 
 
where consumer surplus is given by V(P,y) = ∑
i=1
n
vi((P+aiwi)/gi) and profit is given by: 
 
π(P,y) = P ∑
i=1
n
xi((P+aiwi)/gi)/gi–C([x1((P+aiwi)/g1)/g1+..+xn(P+aiwi)/gn)/gn],y) (20) 
 
The firm’s optimisation problem with a common price per unit is: 
 
max
P y
 S(P,y) s.t. π(P,y)≤ π_     (21) 
 
In this case Ramsey pricing is equivalent to average cost pricing, though average cost is 
determined by the quality level chosen. The Lagrangian for the optimisation problem (21) is: 
 
L(P,y,λ) =  V(P,y) + π(P,y) + λ(π(P,y)-π_) 
= ∑
i=1
n
vi(P+aiwi)/gi) - λπ_ 
+(1+λ)[P ∑
i=1
n
xi((P+aiwi)/gi)/gi –C([x1(P+aiwi)/g1)/g1+..+xn(P+aiwi)/gn)/gn],y)] (22) 
 
The first order condition ∂L/∂P=0 yields the familiar Ramsey condition: 
 
P-C1
P   = ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞λ
1+λ
1
Ex    (23) 
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where Ex= ∑
i=1
n
[XiEix]/X is elasticity of the total demand curve. Eliminating  λ from the first 
order condition ∂L/∂P=0 and ∂L/∂y=0 yields: 
 
fn+1(x1,…,xn,y) = ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞P-C1
y X P  ∑
i=1
n-1
 
 ∑
j=i+1
n
 
 
  X
iXj ( )Εi X - Εj X [ ](P+aiwi)ε i gy - (P+ajwj)ε j gy  (24) 
         
where the RHS of (24) may be interpreted as the ‘rate of return constrained’ marginal 
revenue of quality. Equilibrium quality is above (equal, below) the cost minimising level if 
fn+1>(=,<)0.5 
 It is of interest to determine how the profit maximising monopolist skews quality 
when it must set a common price per unit. The monopolist’s quality and quantity choice is 
depicted in figure 1. The monopolist maximises profit at the point Πm, where the iso-total-
revenue curve, Rm= ∑
i=1
n
 (P+aiwi)Xi, is tangent to the iso-total-cost curve Fm. Quality is 
unskewed at the point Πm, where the indifference curve Vu is tangent to Fm, the iso-total-cost 
curve. That is, quality is unskewed when the quantity-quality combination is (Xu, yu). Note 
that figure 1 is drawn is drawn so that at the point chosen by the profit maximising 
monopolist, Πm, quality is downwardly skewed, as the MRS<MRT. The difference between 
the efficient levels of quantity and quality (Xe, ye), and profit maximising levels of quantity 
and quality (Xm, ym) can thus be decomposed into two parts. The component between (Xe, ye) 
and (Xu, yu) is the unskewed component while the (Xu, yu) and (Xm, ym) is the skewed 
component. 
To identify the direction of skewness define:  
 
Z(X,y) ≡ F2(X,y) - ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞S2(X,y)
S1(X,y) F1(X,y)    (25) 
                                                 
5 In the analysis of Levhari and Peles (1973) and Kihlstrom and Levhari (1977) all customers are homogenous 
(the elasticity of satisfaction with respect to quality is one for all customers and all customers have a common 
elasticity of demand) and ai is zero for all customer types.  Thus firms produce the cost minimising level of 
quality. 
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The locus of unskewed quantity and quality is the contract curve, i.e the sets (X,y) where the 
social indifference curve is tangent to the iso-(total) cost curve (so that Z(X,y)=0).  The 
contract curve is implicitly given by the equation: 
 
fn+1(g1(y)X1,…, gn(y)Xn,y)  
= ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞(P-C1)
yXPεx ∑
i=1
n-1
 
 ∑
j=i+1
n
 
 
 X
iXjEixEjx (aiwi- ajwj)[ ](P+aiwi)ε i gy-(P+ajwj)ε j gy  (26) 
 
It is apparent from (26) that when customer types have a common time cost per unit then the 
contract curve coincides with the cost minimising curve. When, however there is a 
homogenous taste for quality, but some heterogeneity in time cost per unit, the contract curve 
lies above the cost minimising curve. 
In equilibrium, the direction of skewness is given by: 
 
Z(X,y)= ⎝⎜
⎛
⎠⎟
⎞(P-C1)Ex
yXPεx ∑
i=1
n-1
 
 ∑
j=i+1
n
 
 
 X
iXj(ε ix-ε jx)[ ](P+aiwi)ε i gy-(P+ajwj)ε j gy  (27) 
 
In the case of uniform pricing, quality is downwardly (un-,upwardly) skewed with respect to 
type i’s quantity if Z(X,y) <  (=, >) 0.   
By inspection of (24) and (27), it is apparent that the direction of skewness of 
equilibrium quality will correspond with its direction away from the cost minimising level 
(i.e. fn+1 and Z are equal) when all types have a common time cost per unit, (aiwi = ajwj for all 
i,j). In general this need not be the case. However to help identify those cases in which this 
relationship does hold the following definition is useful.  
Definition 2: (i) Customers have (uniformly, inversely) ordered taste and elasticity if, 
for all i,j, ε i gy>εj  gy, ε ix > (=,<) ε jx,  aiwi = ajwj. (ii) Customers have (uniformly, inversely) 
ordered time cost per unit and elasticity if, for all i,j, aiwi > ajwj, ε ix > (=,<) ε jx,  ε i gy=ε ι gy. 
Without loss of generality the types can be ordered so that the elasticity of satisfaction per 
unit with respect to quality or the time cost of income decreases with the index, i. 
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Consequently, using definition 2: 
Proposition 3: Suppose the monopolist sets a common price per unit for all customers. 
(a) The monopolist sets the cost minimising quality and quality is unskewed if: 
(i) the profit constraint is not binding (λ=0), or 
(ii) Customer types have a common time cost per unit, (aiwi = ajwj for all 
i,j) and a homogenous taste for quality (ε i gy = ε j gy for all i,j), or 
(iii) Customers have a common elasticity of demand (ε ix=ε jx for all i,j). 
(b) Quality is greater (less) than the cost minimising level and quality is upwardly 
(downwardly) skewed if customers have (inversely) ordered taste and elasticity.  
(c) Quality is upwardly (downwardly) skewed if customers have (inversely) ordered 
time cost per unit and elasticity.  
(d) Quality is below the cost minimising level if customers have uniformly ordered 
time cost per unit and elasticity. 
As is usual (under profit maximisation or the Ramsey pricing rule), the firm maximises its 
benefit by lowering the relative the price of satisfaction to the group with the most elastic 
demand. Suppose, for example, type1 customers are the group with the most elastic demand. 
One way to lower the price of satisfaction is to raise quality. If, additionally, type 1 customers 
are more sensitive to quality changes than other types (i.e. ε1 gy > ε j gy for j≠1) then an increase 
in quality lowers their price of satisfaction by relative to that of the other types. Similarly, if 
type 1 has the highest time cost per unit, an increase in quality will lower that type’s price of 
satisfaction more than it does other types. This means profit is increased by upwardly 
skewing quality. Specifically the RHS of (24), i.e. the constrained marginal revenue of 
quality, is positive. The monopolist’s requirement to raise revenue not only leads to an 
inefficiently low quantity produced, but also leads (in this instance) to an upwardly skewed 
quality.  
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4. An Example 
 
In the example considered in this section it is assumed that consumers have the 
following constant elasticity demand function: 
 
xi=Ai/(pi/wi)α
i
       (28) 
 
where Ai>0 is the level of type i consumer’s demand and αi>0 is the elasticity of demand of 
type i customers. (The assumption of constant elasticity allows abstraction from the 
variations in demand elasticity that arises from the movement along a customer type’s 
demand curve.)  
Assume also that firms have the following ‘constant returns to scale’ cost function: 
 
C(X,y) = Xψ(y)      (29) 
 
where ψ′(y) >0 and ψ″(y) >0. For the constant returns to scale cost function, (14) implies the 
minimum cost quality level is given by: 
 
fn+1 = ∑
i=1
n
 xiΓi′(y^) = 0     (30) 
 
where Γi(y) = a
iwi + ψ(y)
gi(y) . Define y^
i by Γi′(y^i) ≡0. Call y^i the optimal quality for type i 
consumers. It is level of quality that would be provided to type i customer if the firm could 
differentiate its product.  When y^i < y^ type i’s optimal quality is below the cost minimising 
quality level. Increasing the level satisfaction of type i increases their weighting in the 
calculation of the cost minimising quality. This lowers the cost minimising level of quality 
when y^i < y^.  
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Consider first the case in which all customer types have the same elasticity of 
demand, αi=α for all i.6 Proposition 1 and proposition 2 implies that quality is not skewed 
and equal to the cost minimising level under third degree price discrimination. The cost 
minimising quality under thirst third degree price discrimination is given implicitly by: 
 
εψy(y) =  
∑
i=1
n
{Ai[ ]aiwi+ψ(y)/ψ(y)gi(y)  1-αε i gy(y)}
 ∑
i=1
n
{ }(Ai/gi)[aiwi+ψ(y)/ψ(y)gi(y)]-α}
    (31) 
   
Thus quality is independent of π_ (or equivalently λ) and Swan invariance holds. That is, the 
quality the monopolist chooses is the efficient level of quality (Swan 1970). 
Similarly, under a common price per unit, proposition 3 implies that quality is not 
skewed when all customer types have a common elasticity of demand. Quality is equal to the 
cost minimising level if there is a heterogenous taste for quality but a common time cost per 
unit. The cost minimising level of quality is given implicitly by:  
   
∑
i=1
n
 Ai(gi(y^))αΓi′(y^) = 0    (32) 
 
Thus, again, quality is independent of π_ (or equivalently λ) and Swan invariance holds. 
However if there is a heterogeneous time cost per unit, but a homogenous taste for 
quality, then, by proposition 3, the firm chooses quality below the cost minimising level. The 
cost minimising quality satisfies: 
 
                                                 
6  This assumption may be a reasonable approximation when customer types have a common distribution of 
demand within them. Differences across customer types then would only arise because of either taste for quality 
or incomes. 
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dy^
dP = 
α( )xnΓn′(y^)
f(n+1)(n+1) ⎩⎨
⎧
⎭⎬
⎫
 
1
P+anwn  -   
∑
i=1
n-1
 ( )xiΓi′(y^)/(P+aiwi)
∑
i=1
n-1
 xiΓi′(y^)
  (33) 
 
where  xnΓn′(y^) >0 as type n’s have the lowest preference for quality. In general it is not 
possible to unambiguously sign dy^/dP for n≥3. However if n=2 then dy^/dP>0. In this case the 
cost minimising quality is below the efficient level (for P>C1). Thus, in the n=2 case 
equilibrium quality is below the efficient level.  
When the elasticity of demand differs across customer types propositions 2 and 3 
indicates that quality is skewed. A set of numerical simulations are used to indicate the 
relative impact and importance of skewing. The simulations assume two customer types and a 
profit maximising monopolist (λ=∞). In particular, it is assumed that α2=1.01 A1=1, A2=5, 
a1=a2=1, w1=5, w2=1, ψ(y)=0.1y1.5, g1(y) = y0.1 and g2(y)=y0.9. Table 1 presents the 
equilibrium values of the variables in the model for various values of the α1.The values of the 
parameters are chosen to give a clear impression of the impact on skewing. In particular the 
low value of type 2 customers’ the elasticity of demand allows for calculations in which there 
is a substantial difference between α2 and α1.  
In this formulation the value of the optimal quality for type 1 customers is y^1=2.34 
and the value of the optimal quality for type 2 customers is y^2= 6.08. For comparison 
purposes table 1 provides the price (per unit), P1, P2 and quality level, yt, under third degree 
price discrimination for each of the parameter values. Note that as type 1 customers’ demand 
becomes more elastic, the quantity they consumer increases. Thus, with the increase in their 
elasticity of demand, type 1 customers’ preference come to dominate the setting of quality 
under third degree price discrimination (with these parameter values).  
Table 1 reports simulations on the assumption that firms are constrained to set a 
common price per unit. The table shows, for each set of parameter values, the variables under 
the assumptions (i) quality and quantity is chosen to maximise profits (m superscript), (ii) 
quality is unskewed (u superscript) and (iii) quality and quantity are chosen efficient (e 
superscript). The unskewed values are calculated on the assumption that total cost is the same 
as that for the profit maximising monopoly. First observe that when α1=1.01 that (as 
indicated by proposition 2) the monopolist does not skew quality, thus the unskewed and 
profit maximising simulations coincide. Figure 1 can be used to interpret the simulations for 
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α1>1.01. In particular the profit maximising monopolist downwardly skews quality (ym<yu). 
However the efficient quality, ye, is less than the unskewed quality. The net effect however is 
that the effect of skewing dominates, and quality is below the efficient level (ym<ye).  
The unskewed price (per unit), Pu, is higher than monopoly price, Pm, though recall 
that the unskewed quality is much higher than the monopoly quality. As quality is 
downwardly skewed, the unskewed quantity, Xu, is below Xm, the profit maximising level. 
Indeed the unskewed quantity for both types is less than monopoly quantity (Xui<Xmi).  
 Table 1 reports the surplus (S) and consumer surplus (vi) for both customer types. 
Skewing lowers the surplus (i.e. Sm<Su), the amount increases by the difference increases 
with α1. In these simulations skewing contributes a substantial amount (20-30%) to the 
lowering of surplus due to the exercise of monopoly power. In the simulations type 2 
customers have a higher consumer surplus when quality is unskewed rather than set at the 
profit maximising level. The reverse is true for type 1 customers. Thus the skewing of quality 
by the profit maximising monopolist advantages type 2 customers and disadvantages type 1 
customer.  
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Table 1 
Variable Value of α1 
 1.01 1.2 1.5 2 2.5 3 
 Third degree price discrimination 
yt 4.64 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 
X1t 0.01 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.29 
X2t 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
P1 601 27.24 11.12 5.75 3.96 3.06 
P2 201 137.70 137.70 137.70 137.70 137.70 
 Common price per unit 
Sm 966 510 500 497 496 494 
Su 966 512 502 500 499 497 
Se 1003 528 513 508 507 506 
v1m 479 16.71 4.90 1.61 0.67 0.21 
v1u 479 15.94 4.30 1.21 0.41 0.09 
v1e 500 24.86 9.54 4.85 3.19 2.35 
v2m 478 485.6 488 490 490 489 
v2u 478 488.7 492 494 494 492 
v2e 503 503 503 503 503 503 
ym 6.08 2.12 1.77 1.58 1.49 1.47 
yu 6.08 6.48 6.78 7.06 7.12 6.78 
ye 4.65 4.65 4.66 4.67 4.68 4.70 
Pm 450 35.43 17.05 11.22 10.11 12.81 
Pu 450 52.23 27.79 20.22 19.60 26.21 
Pe 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 
Xm 0.21 0.22 0.38 0.50 0.51 0.38 
Xu 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.19 
Xe 3.35 3.34 3.33 3.31 3.30 3.28 
X1m 0.11 0.08 0.11 0. 10 0.07 0.02 
X1u 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.01 
X1e 0.83 0.828 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.78 
X2m 0.11 0.133 0.27 0.40 0.44 0.38 
X2u 0.11 0.092 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.19 
X2e 2.52 2.51 2.51 2.51 2.50 3.28 
 
 20 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper considers the quality of a good supplied by a monopolist whose customers 
may have heterogeneous taste for quality and/or time cost per unit. These differences in 
customer characteristics, and their impact on demand, are modelled explicitly. The firm 
cannot, for cost or political reasons, use varieties of differing quality to segment the market 
according to these characteristics. The social welfare and profit maximising quality are 
identified under the assumptions that (i) the firm can third degree price discriminate and (ii) 
the firm must set a uniform price per unit to all customers.  
The balance of quality and quality of the good is assessed by determining if and how 
quality is skewed.  The model shows that the monopolist skews quality in order to increase 
revenue except in a number of special cases. For instance quality is unskewed if all customers 
types have the same elasticity of demand. This requirement may seem too unlikely a 
coincidence to hold in practice but, in fact, that may not be so. Recall that the type’s elasticity 
of demand is the average of the elasticity of demand within the type. For many goods there is 
no a priori reason why a particular substitutability of quality for quantity or the time cost 
should be systematically associated with particular elasticity of demand. If there is no such 
systematic relationship, then it would be expected that the average demand of each customer 
type will be equal. In this case, when the demand curve is relatively iso-elastic, quality will 
not be skewed. 
For example, consider a take away coffee shop operating in the central business 
district of a city. The customers of this coffee shop will have a variety of income levels. 
However, because all are working in similar circumstances, it is conceivable that the average 
elasticity of demand does not vary significantly between these income groups. If this is the 
case the quality of the coffee would not be skewed, and the difference between the quality 
level chosen by the firm and the efficient level is described purely by movements along the 
contract curve. In this case it was shown, in section 4, that quality will be below the efficient 
level when the firm has a constant returns cost function and two customer types. 
In contrast, consider a coffee shop (or diner) on a highway. The coffee shop’s 
customers might be divided into locals and travellers. For the usual reasons, the locals are 
likely to have more elastic demand than the travellers. If either the income level or the taste 
for quality differs between the travellers and locals, then the quality of coffee will be skewed. 
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In particular, if the income level of locals is lower than that of travellers, the quality of coffee 
will be downwardly skewed.  
In many other cases it could be argued that there is a systematic relationship between 
the elasticity of demand and the customer type. Consider, for example, a public transport 
system. The customer of public transport could be divided into two types: commuters and 
casual users.  Because of their relatively higher reliance on public transport, commuters are 
likely to have relatively inelastic demand. Because they are engaged in full time employment, 
commuters are also likely to have a relatively high time cost. In this case proposition 3 
suggests that the quality of the public transport system will be downwardly skewed.  
  The analysis in this paper can be adapted to investigate closely related issues. The 
literature on quality choice is closely related to that on durability choice (see Waldman 2003 
for a recent survey). The primary difference is that the former is usually modelled within a 
static framework, while the latter necessarily models dynamics of product durability. 
Consequently the static quality models are most readily applied to describing the 
determinants of the quality of non-durable goods or services. Nonetheless the model 
presented in this paper can act as a guide to the determinants of durability, particularly when 
the details of the dynamic adjustment of durability are not important. 
The model presented in section 3 may also be modified to apply to government 
business enterprises. Such firms are often thought to act as revenue maximising subject to a 
non-negative profit constraint, rather than profit maximising as assumed in this paper. The 
modelling in this paper can be readily modified to accommodate this change in assumptions 
by replacing profit maximisation with revenue maximisation as the objective of the firm. It is 
then straightforward to show that the revenue-maximising firm skews quality in a manner 
similar to that described in by the model presented in this paper. 
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